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CHAPTER

I

IN'rRODUC TION

In 1954 Guatemala was the scene of a coup
d'etat in which the .Al'benz government was overthrown
by a military junta.

President Jacob Arbenz was re-

placed by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, one of the
leaders of the rebels.
usual recriminations.

The revolution produced

U1e

Many Latin Americans asserted

that the United States bad engineered the coup to protect the investments of Yankee businessmen in Guatemala.
The United States was charged with being overly solici-

tous about the position of the United Fruit Company.l

on the other hand, the United States accused the Arbenz
government of communist domination arx'i called the
President a willing tool of the Soviet government.
the revolution

or

Thus

1954 raises many interesting

q,uest1ons. 2
l

"Guatemala," IJ.'ime, June 28, 1954, p. 39.

2

York:

Daniel James, Red Design tor the Americas (New
John Day Company,~954), P• 66.
l

2

Was President Arbena truly an idealist?
he sincere in his agrarian reforms?

Was

Were social and

economic justice for the people major objectives ot his
program?

Or was he indeed a tool of the communists?

Was the United States merely an interested by-stander
or did she actually promote the revolution in the
interest of "dollar diplomacy" and a new extension of
the Monroe Doctrine?

Should the revolution be viewed

as still another manifestation of the 1nsurrect1onary
propensity as suggested by the Wall Street Journal? 3
Answers to these and other questions must come from an
intensive investigation of the political and economic
events of the 1950 1 s.
Guatemaian history is tilled with domestic
turmoil.

Power is in the hands of a small but affluent

minority.

Poverty, illiteracy, and disease are wide-

spread among the population.

The majority of the

population are of Indian ancestry. 4

The Indian popula-

tion speaks one or more of the f1f teen dialects which
makes communication difficult with the government, and.
!

4

The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1959, p. 1.

Estimates indicate that from f ifty-th~ee to
seventy-five percent of the total population are at
least part-Indian.

3

most important, their employers.

In addition to

illiteracy and disease, the Guatemalan Indians are, and
have been tor centuries, afflicted with paganism and
superstition.

The lite expectancy ot the Indian laborer

is thirty-six years.

Consequently, the ranks ot labor

are continuously expanded by the cheap and plentiful
child labor torce.5
r.rh.e missionaries have campaigned extensively,

on behalf of Christianity, education, and better health,
with varying degrees of succesa.6

The prevalent reli-

gion in Guatemala is Roman Catholicism.

However, the

more sophisticated urban population in the country do
not take Catholicism seriously.

Political leaders con-

tinually exploit the organization and wealth of the
Church when it is to their advantage, and openly desecrate the Church when it is opposed to the governmental
policies.7
5

Austin F. Macdonald, Latin American Politics
and Government (1954), P• 615.
6The opinion ot this author, which is shared by
many, is that the missionary contingent from north ot
the Rio Grande, should first concentrate their capabil1·
ties and funds, in restoring and improving the values,
faith, and respect of the urban population who are only
nominal Christiana.

7nonald E. Worch&ster, The Growth and Culture
of Latin .America (1956), P• 113.

4

The open desecration of the catholic Church in
Guatemala was not one of the principal aims of the communist tacticians because the Church was largely free
from political activity. 8

Even during the despotic rule

of General Ubico it consciously refrained from attacking
the government.

The Church concerned itself with non-

political areas; helping to soften the impact of poverty
and to alleviate the despair of the multitudes.

Because

of these activities the long-suffering peasantry were

devoted to the Church.
The communists carefully appraised the situation
taking into account the attitudes of the people.

Slowly

they began to formulate plans to distribute their sub-

versive forces of propaganda.
harass the Church was wise.

Their reluctance to
They could not influence

the Church and to openly tight it would result in the
antagonism of a formidable opponent.
Although pure blooded Indians leave Mass at the
catholic Cathedral to w:>rah1p the pagan gods of their
Mayan ancestors, they respect the hierarchy of the
Church.

They are impressed by the Church rituals; the

pomp and ceremony.

They eagerly attend the celebrations

and test1v1t1es, and often consult the local priest tor
aid in a personal problem.

Therefore, in this way the

illiterate Indian, although retaining the beliefs of the

-

8tb1d.

5

Mayan religion, finds himself falling into the routine
of the Catholic Churah.. 9

It is not the peasantry, but

the urban inhabitants who pay understanding homage
through the Catholic Church.
The Indian labor platoon was used for exploita•
tion and continued deprivation on the aristocratic
plantations.

Downtrodden and disgruntled Indians have

long been used as the foot soldiers by leaders or
rebellions and counter-rebellions.

1954, for example, was fought
Indian le.borer.

by

The revolution or

the ever-present

The army, fearing for their own

security, however, would not consent to arming Indiana,
as they feared Indian retaliation against any regime
throughout the country.10
Certainly the need for political, economic and
social reform in Guatemala has been great.

It is not,

therefore, surprising that recent governments have been
exposed to revolutions led by leaders who champion the
cause of' reform tor personal gain.
9 Ibid., P• 117.

10David L. Graham, Nation, November 9, 1957,
P• 314.

CHAPTER II
POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF GUATEMALA

The history of Guatemala is similar to that ot
the majority ot Latin-American countries.

The road to

independence was difficult and turbulent.

Usually the

presidents have been of the oaud1llo breed.
on horseback" has been the rule.

The "man

Many of the dictators

have had a long tenure in off ice by Latin-American
standards and some have been benevolent but none have
been addicted to political democracy.
of

Thus the people

Guatemala have had 11 ttle experience w1 th

self-government.
The most influential or the recent despots were
Manual Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) and Jorge Ubico (19311944).

Estrada was elevated to the presidency in 1898.

He reigned as ruling despot for twenty-two years.

Like

most dictators, he paid scant attention to human rights.
although all or his constitutions in theory guaranteed
civil rights.l
was successful.

In 1920• one of many revolution attempts

The once powerful Estrada died poor and

tor gotten in 1924.
1 Macdonald• op. cit •• P• 118.
6

7

The regime of General Jorge Ubico is still an

influence on present-day politics.

Many ot his former

aids and discipline-enforcers are reportedly in positions of power in the present government.2

Ubico•s

dictatorial methods of administration and suppression
did contain some noteworthy achievements.

To combat

depression, Ubioo entered into reciprocal trade agreements with the United States, allowing tree entry ot
coffee to the United States during

~Vorld r;~ar

Thia

II.

cooperation with the United states undoubtedly precipi•
ta ted additional investment of .foreign capital and
technology in Guatemala during the post-war years.
Ubico also expropriated all German land holdings during
World War II. 3

During his administration new roads

were built, schoola were expanded, and general economic
prosperity prevailed.

These accomplishments help to

promote the idea that Latin J\mer1can nations are not
ready for complete deomcracy, but need governments that

will pursue stringent economic and social reform programa.
However, some Guatemalans lamented that the
price of their economic prosperity was too high.

They

viewed with alarm the lack of personal freedom and the
increased restrictions on their political and social
2 James, op. cit., P• 63.
3

ill.9.•,

P• 65.

8

activities.

Opposition to Ub1co became so great that he

was forced to abdicate in May, 1944. 4

Ubioo's forced resignation resulted in political
chaos for a time.

He attempted to continue his control

of the country through a puppet president, General Ponce.
But Guatemalans soon forced the resignation of Ponce,
and Ubico was forced to seek asylum in the British consulate.

Ironically, the end result of the overthrow of

Ubico's regime was the election of an ineligible
candidate as president. 5

Following a period of confusion

in October, 1945, a committee of liberation announced a
general election to replace the Ubico congress.

J"uan

Jose Arevalo, a forty-two year old school teacher, was
the nominee of a composite of political parties •
.cU"evalo had resided in Argentina for ten years and according to Jua temalan law was technically ineligible
for office.

Nonetheless, Arevalo captured the imagina-

tion of the voting populace and he was consequently

elected president by an overwhelming majority.6

He

received ninety-two percent of the popular vote and
assumed otfiee in March, 1946.

Although Arevalo

4 J, D. Martz, Communist Infiltration in Guate-

~ (New York:

Vantage Press, 1956), P• 103.

5
Macdonald, op. eit., P• 118.

·'

9

received ninety-two percent of the vote, control ot the
Army is tantamount to control of the government.
llrevalo described himself as a "spiritual
social1st,•7 committed to ideological socialism with no
affinity for Marxism terminology.

Most correspondents

believed .Arevalo's sincerity in espousing a reform program.

Arevalo soon realized that his civilian status

wcnld alienate the military.

Purthermore his reform

program endangered his position with the aristocratic
landowners.

His main strength was the active endorse-

ment of the intellectuals but they were small in number
and

unar ganized.
The 11revalo government was influenced by

finance minister Jorge Toriello, and the latter's power
soon forced a test of strength.

Arevalo gradually

strengthened his alliances with the army and Toriello
was forced to resign in March, 1946. 8
Arevalo revoked Ubico's ban on labor unions in
1946.

Many correspondents and close observers point to

this event as the first good opportunity for the infil-

tration of communist and communist potential in the

reorganization of Guatemalan unions.

Management, as

usual, was adamant to the reorganization of unions.

The

70 Guatemala," Current History, XXIV (March, 1953),
P• 143.
8 Martz, op.

cl~.,

P• 105.

10

majority or businessmen in Guatemala ignored the unions,
and allowed. them to be control.led by those opposed to
management. 9
construction

The unions which were embroiled in the re-

or

by-laws, labor philosophy, and organiza-

tion had little recourse but to turn to the increasingly
powerful communists and their readily available adm1n1strative and monetary ass! stance.

Mexican labor leader

Vicente Lombardo Toledano was prominent in the erection
and solidification of labor unions.

Toledano denies

communist affiliation but his ideas and tactics are
1nd1 stinguishable from standard .Marxist procedures. 10

Arevalo worked strenuously on behalf ot

economic reform, Which helped pacify dissident peasants.
He effectively eradicated the remaining hostile elements

by inflicting a strong censorship of the press and a

methodical wave of assassinations of conservative.
leaders.
The first peaceful and constitutional transmission of office in decades was accomplished in March,
1951.

Arevalo 1 s personal choice to succeed him was

Colonel Jacob Arbenz Guzman.

Arbens, a thirty-seven-

year old defense minister under Arevalo, was acclaimed
president over one hundred aspirants for office.

lOJames, op. cit., P• 65.

Other

11

candidates were never given an adeqµate opportunity to
present themselves to the voters, so Arbenz achieved an
easy victory. 11
.Arbenz continued the reforms of Arevalo with
great vigor.

It is not surprising that his administra-

tion was also charged with being pro-communist.

Close

observers of Central America claimed that Guatemala was
fast becoming a Russian satellite at the beginning ot

the July, 1954, liberation.

'rhe communist propaganda

machine was reportedly printing textbooks, pamphlets,
posters, and magazines for distribution.
written in Spanish,

~ere

These books,

reportea increasing in number

during the last days of the Arbenz reign.

In 1953 the

cabinet and congress began to advocate leftist policies,
although pro-American press and radio service were still
in operation. 12

One reporter contended that "the

government wants outsiders to think it is just a silly
harmless democratic little bunch of grain tarmers.• 13
Apparently few people read what those on the
scene were writing about Guatemala.

Arbenz•s red

llT1me. XX.XVIII (March 26 1 1951).
l 2 see, tor example, Keith Monroe 0 Guatemala,
What the Reda Lett Behind,• Harpers Magaz!ne, CLXXXI
(July, 1955), P• 61.
13~.

12
tendencies were not suspected even after his land reform
program or 1952.

Arbenz's land reform (or land grab. as

American bns1nessmen preferred to call it) consisted
mainly of nat1onal1z1.ng all of the uncultivated land.
Exceptions were the small land-owning properties.

The

principal victim was the United Fruit Company which had
234.000 acres confiscated.

The Arbenz government

offered payment for confiscated land at the assessed
value which is far below its actual worth.
to be in long-term bonds instead of cash.

Payment was
Although

Arbenz' s land assessments were far below their real
evaluation, some theorists proclaim that 1f these offers
would have been accepted• Arbenz would not have relied
on red-1nf ested unions for his support.
Nationalist-minded Guatemalans pictured Arbenz
as a do-gocder attempting to vanquish gringo businessmen.
Many confidants of Arbenz believed his army background,
political finesse, and alert intelligence would make him
immune to communism. 14

But Monroe claimed that gradual

sweet talk and the persistent pressure by connnunist
party members slowly converted Arbenz to a devout
communist. 15
14Alfred. Barnaby, Thomas, Latin America, A

History (New York: Macmillan Company). P• 50.

l 5Monroe, "Guatemala, What the Reds Lett
Behind.• op. cit •• PP• 64-65.

13

Arbenz was proud of the fact that his most
f"ai thful subordinates did an eff 1c1ent job wi th~u t accepting graft.

F'tlrthermore, he knew many of these men

were members of the communist party.
for a specific cause.

They were working

This growing contingent worked

overtime and on Sundays w1 thou t monetary compensation.

Arbenz round himself relying on these men to keep the
machinery of government functioning. 16
The General Confederation of Labor was, to many
informed observers, a reu-dominated and very potent
organization.

The reds were successfully infiltrating

the Labor Unions since 1946.
Indif!UilS

Large percentages of

and farmers followed the General Confederation

of Labor.

Arbenz found himself conspiring with the reds

to obtain a constitutional revision to secure his
re-election. 17
Monroe emphatically claims that the reds
persuaded Arbenz to oppress all opposition and become an
enlightened dictator of the poor.

In 1953 and 1954,

Arbenz replaced Supreme Court Judges with his own henchmen, and ruthlessly repelled student demonstrations with
gunfire.

These events certainly antagonized elements or

the population.

16
17Robert M. Schneider, Communism 1n Guatemala,
1944-1954, PP• 82-83.

14

David L. Graham, the Latin .American correspondent

or

the .!i!.tfon, does not agree with Monroe's inter-

pretation of events.

He contends that calling the .Arbenz

regime communist was pure McCarthyism.

Graham cites

Arbenz liberal movements such as the initiation of
agrarian reform, encouragement of labor unions, and education of the illiterate as examples of real achievement.
'There was considerable evidence of improvement of public
works, expanded credit, better port facilities, and
general economic improvement. 18
Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister in the
Arbenz cabinet, admitted that Arbenz 1 s government was
However, he claimed that it was more repre-

not Utopia.

sentative of the people than past administrations.
Living standards were improved, and illiteracy was on
the decrease.

Toriello al so emphasized that business

and privileged interests were being curbed and that only
four communists were among the f1fty-s1x members of
congress.

Obviously speaking with a biased point of

view, Toriello ma1nta1ned \bat Arbenz was supported by
18nav1d L. Graham, »castillo's Guatemala,R
Na ti on, P• 441.

15
a strong and popular party, which had the encouragement
among others, of a minute communist party. 19
ments

or

The state-

Graham and Toriello minimize the key

characteristic of communist infiltration in Guatemala
and other countries.

Robert M. Schneider, in his book Guatemala,
contends that some communists did maintain influential
positions in certain strategic agencies which administered vital governmental programs, and far more
important they were firmly entrenched 1n sensitive
positions that formulated public opinion. 20

l9schne1der, op. cit., P• 83.
The small nuDiber of communists elected to
congress is a deceiving argument, as it has been proven
1n many countries that communist agents tend to concentrate their attention on appointive offices and policyformula ting positions.

CHAPTER III
THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY

The greatest enigma in Guatemala was, and still

is, the United Fruit Company.

The United Fruit Company

is at the center of charges and counter-charges

or

.American intervention in the internal affairs of another
United Fruit has long been a subject of debate

country.

among writers and students of the Carribbean,
American corporation,

w1

No other

th the possible exception of

Standard 011, has been the subject of debate or more
criticized than the United Fruit Company.
During the greater part of its seventy-year
existe~e,

the United Fruit Company has been attacked as

a state within a state.

It is the biggest economic

enterprise in Central America and of ten its budget exceeds that of the Central American countries in which it

operated.

Because of its size, it has become one of the

most important economic factors and one of the most
skillful political manipulators in Guatemala.
In the ten-year period between 1944 and 1954
the United Fruit Company was the personification ot
"Yankee imperialism."

Communist leaders still maintain

that United Fruit was the underlying reason tor h!ner1can

16

17
intervention in Guatemala in 1954.

This author has

round little convincing evidence of this charge, but
feels sate in stating that the United Fruit company was
well informed regarding the political unrest during the
months preceding tbe celebrated revolution in June,
1954.

On the other hand, United .Fruit was the center

of the agrarian retorm movements by the Arbenz government.

The expropriation of United Fruit holdings

brought immediate diplomatic retaliation.

A short

summary ot the holdings and policies or United Fruit
helps clarify the claims end counter claims of the
Guatemalan and United States business interests.
The United Fruit Company is a huge economic
empire.

It possesses immense tracts of land in ten

Latin-American countries as well as investments in
Europe and .d.frica.

Despite the fact that United Fruit

is generally known as a banana power, only 142,182
acres are planted in bananas, while 1831 099 acres are in
sugar, cacao, oil palm• and other orops. 1
maintains 77,000 head of livestock.

The company

It owns and oper-

ates 1,700 miles of railways representing a fifty-five
million dollar investment.

It owns sixty-five vessels,

forty-nine of which are refrigerated tor carrying fruit.
Accompanying this massive fleet are whartage facilities
which give United Fruit !!!_facto control over many major

lJ. D. Martz, op. cit., P• 124.

18

ports, including Porto Barrios in Guatemala. 2

The

company also owns and operates the first and biggest
radio communication system in central America.

It main-

tains newspapers, schools, commissaries, hospitals,
recreation centers, housing projects, agricultural experimental stations, and medical research laboratories.
Its employees need not go outside the company to
satisfy their basic needs. 3

In a very real sense, it is

a state within a state.
United Fruit and other international
entrepreneurs have incurred the hostility and distrust
of a vast majority of non-communists as well as commun-

istic peoples.

Propagandists use the word "exploitation•

or charge tax fraud to emotionalize their claims.
For example, in 1953 the United

~uit

Company

reaped banana crop valued at mare than il0,000,000 but
paid the government of Guatemala in duties and taxes
only tl,418,000.

.Arevalo can hardly be criticized tor

demanding a new tax arrangement that would give his
regime more capital.

But United lf'ruit refused to re-

negotiate old contracts regarding the amount of taxes
2

~.,

3Ib1d.

-

P• 126.

19

to be paid. 4

This was a serious error because when

Arbenz came to power it was too late.

It is interesting

to note that the communists preferred to let the old
contracts prevail as a target for propaganda purposes.
A second and more important is sue in Guatemala
was the unenlightened labor policies of United Fruit.

The company resisted labor organizations before the reds
assumed control over the Guatemalan labor situation.

It

became even mare adamant when the communist-controlled
unions attempted to negotiate new and admittedly extreme
contracts.

The result was years of labor strife charac-

terized by crippling strikes, and retaliatory lockouts
which the communists always managed to exploit. 5
'I'o some

Guatemalans the most grievous of the

allegations against United Fruit was its relationship
with International Railways of Central America.

Through

a series at negotiations, compromises, and manipulations
of stock, United
of

~Tu1t

Company owns forty-three percent

the only national railway, and supplies its own loco-

motives and refrigerated cars.

United Fruit saved

millions of dollars by subsidizing and purchasing control
4 oav1d L. Graham, "Liberated Guatemala,n Nation,
July 14, 1956, P• 34.

-

5ib1d.
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ot the railways·. 6

However, independent as well as

Guatemalan shippers resented the fact that they were
compelled to pay higher rates to ship their products
than the economic baron from the North.
More irritating to the average Guatemalan, who
needed no communist ao nationalist to spur him on, was

the fact that foreigners controlled their only rail
line and only major sea port. 7
Perhaps the United Fruit Company should not be
pictured as completely unsympathetic to the needs
Guatemala.

or

For, in actuality, tremendous advantages

result from American enterpriae in the country through

the building ot hospitals, railroads, and other projects
that created many new forms of employment.

The Great

entrepreneurs are eager to discuss the benefits that
accrue to the backward country when defending their
foreign economic policy.
this benevolence?

Hut what are the motives tor

Are they sincere or is it simply

advantageous for the successful operation ot the
company?
61•Guatemala

aack to '54," New Republic, June 22,

1959, P• 4.

711 Guatemalan Episode," Fo1.. e1~ A.f:f'a1rs April,
1956, pp. 469-472. This animosity woua preva! 1 in the
United states if th~ entire Atlantic seaboard or the
United States was controlled by another country.

21

These sources of irritation show that there was
more than one reason tor the unrest in the diploma tic
relations between the United States and Guatemala.
First, the increasing communist insurgency was not the
only cause for State Department consternation.

Second,

it is obvious that the United States was guilty or
surreptitiously manipulating political movements to protect the interests o.f' her businessmen.

The most obvious

political intrigue centered around the generous corporate tax laws that our corporations in Latin !mierica have
enjoyed.

A major reason for the subtle benevolence ac-

corded the Castillo rebels by United Fruit and other
American concerns, was the rebel chieftain's promised
tax relief for the "oppressed" business interests. 8
The .failure· of .American businessmen to train
Guatemalan executives was a great social and political
error.

This resulted in lasting resentment against the

American companies and made it necessary to use American
personnel in 1954.

Who among Guatemalan nationalists

was capable of operating efficiently the great coffee
and banana plantations?

8 Davici L. Graham, "Detour to Guatemala,"
Nation, P• 325.

CHAPTER IV
THE REVOLUTION OF 1954
The A:rbenz regime was finally ousted 1n June,
1954, by a new revolutionary group headed by Colonel

Carlos Castillo Armas ltlo was later installed as president of Guatemala.

There can be no doubt that Castillo

was anti-connnun1st.

He began his rule in an energetic

fashion.

First, be jailed all suspected communists and

restored political order.

Although he gave limited

approval to some of the agrarian reforms of .Arbenz, the
reform movement was largely hal tea.

master.

Guatemala had a new

Castillo ruled without regard for democratic

action and was aba.it as despotic as any of his
predecessors.
The new president possessed an interesting
background.

some elements of his career are typical of

the Guatemalan emotional pattern, others appear to have
been shaped by the United States.

Born into a poverty-

stricken family, he was grad.uat ed .from a military
academy, and received staff officer training at Fort
Leavenworth in the United States.

During his training

in the United· States, he was noted for his fervent
hatred of communism.

'l'his fact obviously pleased many
22

23

American diplomats and businessmen.

He returned home

and immediately plunged into politics.

In 1950, he was

almost executed for plotting a conspiracy against the
govemmen t.

He made a daring escape from prison through

a thirty-eight-foot tunnel. 1
The open approval which Castillo received from
the United States during and after his coup d'!!!,! requires an explanation.

Many articles have been written

about Castillo, but all lack objectivit7.

Harpers

Magazine contends that he was coerced by existing conditions into becoming a martial-law president.

Many Latin-

.American presidents have instigated thirty-day or longer
martial laws, when seeds ot conspiracy were present. 2
Guatemala bordered on political chaos in June,
1954.

The government was bankrupt, unemployment was

high, tho tourist trade greatly diminished.

When

Castillo commenced to seek out and exile known communists, his most efficient administrative help was
eliminated.

His credit vanished, Americans and wealthy

Guatemalans began to reinvest their profits in other
countries.

v¥0l'k projects were halted. 3

Castillo had to

~1m~. August a, 1956, p. 2a.
2Monroe, •What the Reda Lett Behind,• Harpers
Magazine, July, 1955, p. 63.
3 current History, XXIV (March 24, 1953), p. 145.

24

make some changes in policy.

The expropriated landa ot

the United Fruit Company were returned.

New petroleum

laws were instituted and the government invited twentyeight foreign oil companies to begin operations in
Guatemala.

Laws were repealed affecting remittances and

taxation of earnings from foreign capital.. 4

An

invest-

menti-guarsn tee-agreement was signed w1 th the United
States.

Our ambassador Furifoy was mentioned as an

influential mediator for United States and Guatemalan
officials.

An eighty-million-dollar loan culminated

these transactions which were highly favorable to the
United States. 5
Castillo's new constitution was much like those
of his i;redeoessors.

Like most Latin-American constitu•

tiona, this one exonerated those in the successtul
revolution and denounced the losers.

The president is

elected under the new constitution, tor a term ot six
years and is ineligible for re-election tor twelve years.
The legislature is unicameral end is popularly ele.cted
every tour years.
president.

A

cabinet or ministers assists the

The supreme court and appellate court are

appointed and removed by congress.

The president ap-

points a governor for each department, and municipal
4 Schneider, op. cit., P• 87.

5L1te, August 12, 1957, P• 41.

25

mayors am councils are elected by popular ballot.

Suffrage is granted to both sexes over eighteen, with a
literacy requirement for women.

6

Article seventy-seven of Castillo's constitution

guaranteed civil rights "except in the case of activities
against the aecuri ty o:f' the state, perpetuation o.f the
peace, public calam1 ty or invasion." Under troubled conspecial "law ot public order" can be invoked

d1 tions a

to replace the c<Xlst1tut1on during the emergency. 7

In

essence this law contends that various degrees of emer•
gency allowing sich things as the firing of troops on
crowds, can be evoked by executive decree except foreign

war, which requires congressional vote. 8
castillo's three-year reign received a favorable
press in the United State,, chiefly because of his anti-

communism.

One of his first acts as president was to

dissolve the labor unions.

Ile later permitted unions to

organize, but not until their leadership was cleared by

the a ll•Paf er:tul Committee for Na ti onal De.f'ense of any
suspicion

of communism.

This movement undoubtedly

pleased many American entrepreneurs.
6rvtaodonald, op. cit., P• 617.
7Monroe, •auatemala, What the Reds Lett Behind,•

Harpers Magazine, July, 1955, P• 63.

-

8tb1d.
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Castillo's constitution contained a powerfully
worded provision which prescribed a three-year penalty
for anyone taking part in an illegal strike.

This pro-

vision also empowered the Committee tor National Defense
to compel a man to stay in jail six months without trial
for mere suspicion of' being or aiding a communist.

9

The

last provision is a powerful weapon in the hands of an
unscrupulous man and amounts to the same as a suspension
of the writ of habeua corpus in the United States.
Castillo inserted some notable changes favor-

able to American diplomats.

Churches and religious

orders denied legal status since 1870, regained their
full lawful rights including the right to property.

Com-

munists and other totalitarian parties were banned.

Also
10
banned was communist activity by individuals or groups.

The exile of citizens, a

f~vorite

Latin-American weapon,

was forbidden, although President Castillo ignored the
ban in order to keep out henchmen of the former adm1n1s-

trat1on and jailed dozens of

~benz

followers.

exiled to El Salvador, law notwithstanding.

Four were

11

Qastillo the •Liberator of Guatemala• was
9 Ib1d., P• 64.

l0nav1d L. Graham, "Detour to Guatemala,• Nation,
P• 326.
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assassinated in July, 1957 while walking with h1s wite
to a palace dinner.

He was only thirty-seven at this

time.

Official sources claimed a psychotic member of
12
the presidential guard was the assassin.

Why was Castillo killed?

Assessment of the

Castillo regime will be difficult.
gains made.

There were many

The communist party was suppressed, United

Fruit Company regained their land holdings, the tourist
trade increased and the United States had invested an
eighty-million-dollar loan.

American oil companies were

investing millions in experimentation and exploration.
Yet, there were many Guatemalans who were not
happy.

There. were the disgruntled peasants who had been

deceived and lost their opportunity to own their own
land.

Labor leaders were dissatisfied with Guatemalan

courts which shamelessly espoused the side of employers
and ignored the persecutions of rural workers by land13
owners.
There was considerable unrest over tood speoulation.

F1'1ends ot Castillo were reputedly cornering

the corn and bean market.

Castillo retaliated against

criticism with police-state methods.

Columnist Jose

Alfredo Palmieri stated that the best

p~ofi

1 2~, August 12, 1957, P• 42.
l3James, op. cit., P• 64.

ts are always
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made on lm.nger, and food speculation hands the com14
munists ready-made arguments,
Castillo like previous
leaders, suppressed some elements in order to gain the
power and confidence of other parts of the population,
Finally, Castillo was criticized because of
his close association with the United States.

College

students in Guatemala do not care tor sports but they
thrive on continual harassment of unpopular governments.
The annual Easter Rag is a merry-making holiday of college
students with political implications.

Shortly before the

assassination of Castillo, the students depicted the
. sentiments of many Guatemalans with a skit commencing
with

a ah art

prayer.
in Washington." 15

The title was "our Father

Who

Art

Castillo's assassination created another crisis.
The September, 1957 election was declared invalid by
political pressure groups.

A three-man junta announced

a new election in November, 1957.

The aged conservative

Ydegoras has emerged as the new president of Guatemala.
The Castillo constitution is still in effect, the
governmental structure is unchanged, but leftist resur16
gence is reportedly gaining strength.

l4•auatemala, Back to
September 18, 195'7, P• 9.

•54,• New

Republic,

15nav1d L. Graham, ncastillo's Guatemala,•
Nation, P• 443.

1 6schne1der, op. cit., P• 87.
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The Ydegoras government is filled with henchmen of the Ubico tyranny.

Men like 4'revado, •roriello,

and Arbenz are reportedly back in Guatemala and gaining influence.

1be continuously swinging pendulum

or

Guatemala government and polities is on a precarious
17
ridge of reform.
Past history and pattern of events
suggest that the pendulum. will swing back to revolution
and produce a new "lioerator" for Guatemala.

17 "Guatemala Back to 154,• ~ew Republic, P• 4.

CHAP'.rER

V

THE UNITED STATES AND THE REVO LU'l'ION

The United States has always taken a vital
interest in the affairs of Latin-American nations, particularly in Central America and the island republics
of the Caribbean.

As early as 1823, President Monroe

stated the proposition 1n the Monroe Doctrine that the

United States would consider it an unfriendly act for
any European nation to try to take control of any independent nation in the ~estern Hemisphere.l

Although

modi tied and sub je o ted to various int erpreta ti ons the

doctrine has been perhaps the most consistent element
of the fOt"eign policy of the United Sta tea.

Shortly after 1900 fresident Theodore Rooaevel t
added substantially to the doctrine by declaring that

while the United States could not let &lropean nations
interfere in Latin-America, neither could the United
States allow these countries to conduct themselves in
such a way as to invite intervention.

The "Roosevelt

Corollary," like the original Monroe Doctrine, was a
l

James, op. cit., PP• 21-23.
30
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unilateral proposal.
During William Howard Taft's administration,
United States foreign policy was operated on the basis
of "Dollar Diplomacy".

Investment of Amari can eapi tal

in Central America was openly encouraged and the ad ..
ministration promised protection.

The United States

aspired to gain prestige in these areas through financial interests.

I.ill ter ad.min1stra tions in Washington

attempted to reverse this investment-directed policy of

diplomacy but founa it difficult to ignore the demands
for protection made by American businessmen.
A :reversal \vas achieved, however, in the "Good
Neighbor Folicy" developed during the 193()' s.

This

policy operated on the basis of juridical equality of
all nations in the

~ies

tern hemisphere.

Relations between

the United Sta tea and her ne1 ghbors to the south imme-

diately began to improve.

But w1 th the Second World War

the United States was forced to turn its attention to

Bu.rope.

Thu.s the Good Neighbor Policy became a casualty

of war.

Whether or not the war killed the policy is not

clear, although the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954 seemed
to rein.force the opinion of a great many

Lat1n-.~ericans

that the Good Neighbor Policy was dead.

Many influential Latin-Americans have grave
doubts about the motives behind the Monroe Doctrine.
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It is linked in their minds with the spectre of intervention and foreign interference by the United States.
On the other hanl, individual republics have been quick
to appeal for United States aid when in trouble -Central America in 1834, Columbia and Ecuador in 1848,
Mexico in the l860 1 s, and other situations too numerous
and con.flioting to men ti on.

2

The present-day Latins are skeptical and jealous
of their powerful and r1 ch northern neighbor.

:Many

Latina still live, work and completely rely on Uni·ted
States business firms for their livelihood.
appreciation is submerged because most Latins

Their
(1nclud1~

Guatemalans) consider North Americana as exploiters
fearfully impetuous

w1 th

their new post-war economic

power, and a sometimes fanatical zeal to stamp out commun1sm.

3

They question some of our motives for an

interest in their countries.

'.rhey ask, ere they com-

pletely benevolent or exploitive in nature?

This question of United States military intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin .America is a
constant source of friction.
2

~·•

The stigmatism of dollar

P• 47.

3Frank Tannenbaum, "The Justice of Democracy
in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (April, 1955),
429-444.
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diplomacy is st ill prevalent in Lat.in thinking.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was aware of this
feeling of mistrust during the l950 1 s.

Yet he possessed

sufficient leverage to resolve the problem.

His decree

would determine which nation would receive economic and

te~~nioal assistance from the United States. 4

Therefore,

he proceeded to Caracas in January, 1954, with one main
idea:

to procure a document condemning communist inter-

vention in Latin America.

He was quite willing to

threaten withdrawal of American aid to gain his

.objective.
The Dulles policy of massive retaliation was

applied to the Monroe Doctrine and related legal theorem&
at the meeting of the. Tenth Inter-American .Conference at

Caracas, Venezuela, in March, 1954.

The United States

had previously stated 1n d1plomat1c channels that the
conference must reassert the compact that communism
would be unwelcome in the western hemisphere. 5
Dulles engineered his "legal protectorate" by
a multitude of perSJ.asive methods.

The most et.fective

4"Rev1ew of the Week," New York Times, March 14,
1954.
5New York r.rimea, 1iarch 3, 1954.
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method was the threat of economic reprisals via United
States foreign aid. 6
The following quotation was the most convincing
defense that Dulles could muster to charges of
intervention.
• • • the Conference • • • declares that the
domination or control of the political institutions of any .American state by the International hemisphere the political system of an
extra-continental power, would cons.titute a
sovereignty and political independence of the
American states, -- and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption
of appropriate act;on in accordance w1 th
existing treaties.
Secretary of State Dulles was satisfied that
the principal significance of the Caracas meeting was
that the United States succeeded in .forcing the Organization of American States to agree to a firmer
6ib1d., March 6, 1954. It is 10rthwhile to note
that tbose"Iiitions who supported Dulles were not the
democratic nations but the authoritarians -- Venezuela,
the- Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru.
Sidney Guson described the f eel1ngs of the
Lat1n-.-'llner1cans succinctly: "Senor Toriello (Guatemalan
F'oreign ?ii.inister) had said many nasty things about the
United Jtates that virtually cost them nothing. :Sut not
many were willing to vote against the United States when
tbey might have to set up later in the conference and ask
far economic aid • • • "

7un1ted States Department of State Tenth Inter.americc.n Conference ( -.. ashington, D.c., 1955~, PP• 15G-rn.

35

anti-international communist statement than before.

Guatemala was not specified in the statement; however,
all the delegates were aware of the implied reasoning
behind the statement.
The "existing treaty" that Dulles referred to
was the "Rio Fact" of 1947.

The Rio Treaty, in part,

authorized a meeting of foreign ministers of the hem1sphere to find solutions and take measures necessary
.

tor the o:>mmon defense of all hemispheric nations.

8

After the Caracas meeting the United States
was in a position, according to our state aepartment
legal analysts, to openly intervene and exploit any of'
the abortive international communist attempts to seek
control of a nation in the western hemisphere •
.Philip B. Taylor, University of Michigan political scientist, questioned the 3ubtlety in which

Mr. Dulles conciucted himself after the conference aocepted his International Communist suppression pact.

Taylor stated that Secretary Dulles attendea one meeting
of an economic subcommittee and indicated the United
States was not prepared to discuss Latin-American in-

ternal problems.

His aeparture the next day, March 14,

1954, a full two weeks before official aujournment, was
8 J. 1'elders, United Nations Textbook (Leyaen,

Netherlands, 1954), p. 365.

36

considered by many Latin diplomats as insulting and an
admission that the United States was mainly interested
in the pol1 tical support of La tin-America and not sutficiently interested in their internal economic affairs.

9

Thus Dulles was guilty of injuring his own
scheme.

Many Latina are well aware of the security

threat posed by international communism.

Nonetheless,

one of the main reasons the Latins con vaned at Caracas
was to discuss effective means of solving their mutual
economic problems.

When Dulles gained the desired ame.00.-

ment to the Monroe Doctrine to include international

communism as a foreign invader of our hemisphere, he
disemoarked for

~•ashington,

leaving the Latins with th!t

impression that their interaal affairs were irrelevant.

10

Another result that worried our Latln-.Ameriean
neighbors was the fear that the Caracas resolution would
be used as a coercive weapon against Guatemala.

Secretary

Dulles gave repeated assurances to the delega tea thot the

resolution was not aimed at any one country and that the
United States was solely concerned with intervention of
international communists in this hemisphere. 11

9 .Philip B. 'faylor, "The Guatemalan Affair,"'
American Political Science Review, L (September, 1956),
790.

10~·
ll 11 Rev1ew of the Week, n N,ew York Times, March
14, 1954.
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In SUmmary, Secretary Dulles may have gained
an immediate victory for the United States in its fight
against international comnunism out he lost a great
deal by alienating Latin-American delegates with his
1ncUfferance to their economic problems.
Events leading to the Civil '"Var in Guatemala
were first .PUblicizeu with a state uepartment announcer~1i;;mt

on i.1ay 17, 195•.1, concerning a shipment of arms

.

tha.t had arrived at Puerto i-Ja.rrios,. Guatemala.

12

How-

ever, an interesting event took place the preceding
autumn that deserves some a ttent1 on.
On October 3,

1~53,

John E. Peurit'oy was ap-

pointed United States Ambassador to Guatemala. 13

He

1 2 New .lork Times, }l~ay 18, 1954.
13"u.

s.

Ne!.!..,_!nd w4orld Report, UI Time Mae;azi!!!_.

Peurifoy was a career diplomat who at one time
was an elevator operator in the Capitol Building. He
was a cadet at West Point when he suddenly cp.it, claiming illness of his father. In spite of his humble beginnings, .Peurifoy was soon recognized. as an alert and
aggressive young man. His ascendency 1n the state depar·tmen t rapid. hmrifoy was a tough and able man, an
expert marksman, he was nearly always armed for his
personal protection while at his post in Guetemala. He
achieved notable success dealing with communist antagonism in Greece durinr1; the ·ci v11 strife at 1946-47 and
was held in high :regard by high state department officials in both the Truman anu ~isenhower adm1n1stra t1ona.
John l)eurifo:y was killeu in an au to acc1uent while on
leave 1.n 1957.

had alreadJ esta,Jlished a reputation as an accomplished

anti-communist aiplomat by his activities in Greece, and
1t

ma~1

be cons trued as anything but a coinciuence that

this big.hly successful an ti-communist Uiplomat was tl'linsferred to the sensi t1ve arefi. of Guatemala.

C1:r•cumstan-

ti al evidence makes 1 t hi ';hly improbable that the
reporliedly alert Peurifoy was impervious to the movements
of i\rbenz opponents.

Yet there is no evidence to

1:mplic ate Peurifoy or any United States representative
in the cons,p1racy14 that resulted in Castillo's invasion

of Guatemala from Honuuras.

Eowever, it is a known tact

that Peurifoy, accompanied by an

arme~

guard, was readily

accessible for nen;otiation. 15

14N1nth Interi!!!._Report of Hearings before tl1e
Subco.mrnittee on Latiu Ame.i·ica of the select Committee on
Commun1StAggress1on, House of. Representatives, Eip.httth1rd Congress, Second Session, Washington, l954, P• 24 •
.Flora Lewis, writing of Peurifoy, stated "it was
perfectly clear that his instructions and his purpose had
one simple theme: Get riu of the Heua."
Peur1foy emphatically den1eri these charges, declaring: n • • • I would like to take this opportunity to
explode a popular and flattering myth regarding the part
I played in the revolution • • • • ~iiy role vrns st1,ictly
that of a diplomatic observer • • • • The first and only
octive role that I played.. • • • was to lend my good
of'fices to assist in negotiating a 'l'ruce. • • • "

l5New lork Times, July 3, 1954.
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Arbenz sought asylum in the Mexican embassy on
June 'Z'l th and the initial talks proveu to be inconclusive.
Peurifoy was notified to be present at tu ture meetings.
He claimed he was available for consultation with

everyone 16 and exonerated himself of any diplomatic
pi• es sure

tac ti cs.

J\n agree.men t of total ca pi tula ti on

was si r..;ned on July 2nd and reuri:f'oy retuz•ned to the

United States embassy.

'rwo months after Castillo was

installed in office, Peurifoy was tr.ansferred to another

hostile country:

Bol1 via.

Controversy still rages about the chartered
Swedish ship, ttle Alfhem, and the role it playeo in

coup.

the

Journal is ts agree that the ship carr1eu 1, 900

pounds of arms that; ox•iz,inated in Czechoslovakia and were
destined far Bolivia.

They differ about the type and

effectiveness of the weapons. 17
The United States delighted in using the

shipment to arouse sympathy am widespread propaganda

tor its ant1-Arbenz campaign.

The Alfhem affair was also

the basis for a United States request to search all
mar chant ship a for arms to Guatemala.

This request was

rejected by all nations to which requests were made. 18

16~·
l7Ib1d •• July 9 1 1954.

1 8~., June 19• 1954.
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In the spring of 1954 there occurred a series
of 1nc1dents which might be described as "coincidental."
Sorne authorities claim the even ts were inspired. by the
United States to disguise manipulation of the revolution.

The United States si@:led mutual security treaties with
Nicaragua and Honduras 1 19 the former on April 23, and
the latter on May ID•

Subeeqiently, on May 24, the United States
announced that they we1"e senuing war material to the two

countries.

On May 27 tlu'ee B·36 bombers paid a courtesy

call on the Nicaraguan capital.

l'hese events were

preceded by the breaking of diplomatic relations by

Nicaragua with Guatemala. 20
To conclude that the United States played an
important part in the Guatemalan debacle is feasible.
but would be dif firult to document.

There is no proof

that any of the arms airlifteu from the United States to

19Ibid., June 7. 1954.
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Honduras or Nicaragua, ultimately appeared with
Castillo. 21

News reporters on the scene were of the

consensus that Castillo's troops were armed with anti-

cpated muzzle-loacting rifles, jeeps, DC-3 and P-47
aircraft, of ·v;orld. \.~ar II vintage, sn a brownish green
uniforms. 22 'ii or ld War I I supplies are in abundance
throughout the world.

However, it is not clear Ylhat

type and caliber of war material the United States
airlifted into Honduras and Nicaragua.
The legal. implications of the Guatemalan affair

would involve an understanding of international law
beyond the scope of this pap er.

'I1he one technical point

of law questioned by many writers and never sufficiently
answered was, did any single nation or groups of nations
have the right to ir.vestignte the Guatemalan affair?

2loonald Grant, "Guatemala and United States
Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, IX,
No. l (1955), P• 69.
·
,
The 3aint Louis Post-Dispatch news analyst summarized tnose wno were to blame for the Guatemalan
in~1rrection by stating:
• • • • This writer is not in a
position to assign. precise roles for the events which
culminated 1n the fall of the Arbenz eovernment, al though
he was in tact an eyewitness to many of the decisive
even ts. ~xileu '3'uatemalans, the government of Honduras
and Nicaragua, the United States Departments of State and
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United
States National Security Council and other agencies and
1nd1 viduals were involved."
22L1f e Magazine, July l2 and July 19, 1954.
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The .Arbenz government proposed that the matter
be taken up by the United Nations Seou.r1ty Council,

'roe

United States proposed that the. Guatemalan aftail'

be the subject of the regional organization of the
Organiv.ation of American States.
The American delegate to the United Nations,

Henry Cabot Lodge, held the dual position of representative of the United States

ar1d

Security Council pres1'.iEmt.

Due to Guatemalan-Soviet tactics, Mr, .Lodge was placed
\

in the d.itti cult posi t1on of having to detenu the po11 tical reputation of the Uni teu 3ta tes anJ. at the same
time behave correctly as president of the United Ma ti ons
Security Council. 23 Mr, Lodge's delicate position does

not excuse the conspicuous lack of diplomatic finesse

displayed by the Uniteu States in

~le

Guatemalan affair.

In reply to Guatemala's request that the security council
hear its grievances, Mr. Lodge contended that "· • • • it
is increasingly plain that the situation in Guatemala is

clearly a civil and not an international war. • • .~ 24
This gratu1 tous remark enabled the Soviet propagandist
to correctly inquire if the strife in Guatemala was not
an international but a civil war, why was the united

States

concer~ed?

In other words, the United States was

23
United Nations Document S/PV 6'75-paragraphs
164-172.

24 Ibid.

-
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inadvertently undermining 1ts own policy in Guatemala.

The fear of an investigation ot the Guatemalan
incident by the United Nations was finally squelched by
an American-sponsored Brazilian-Columbia resolution that
thwarted a Soviet-prompted Guatemalan reques·t for a

United Nations investigation of the oontroversy.

The

Latin-ll.l'.l'.lerican s ta tea suosti tu ted an American Peace Commi t tee jurisdiction which floundered in M'.exlco City in
25

a sea of inetfectiveneae.

The failure of the Guatemalan delegate to secure

the introduction of a resolution in the council calling
for United Nahions rather than {;rganization of American
States action may well have been a tactical device designed to condemn the United. States by implication rather
'J6
than by direct charge. Certainly this was the result.'~

Can a case be made that the Guatemalan incident
was precipitated because of the imminence ot the communist
domination7

This, of course, would serve as a rationale

for the behavior of the United States.

The question is

not whether the United States was furtively breeching
international, legal, and mar al codes by intervening in

the internal affairs of another country.

In terms ot

preserving 1 ts good reputation, the Uni teo. States was in

25iraylor, op. cit., P• 802.

-

26 Ibid.
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a position of having to make a case out ot its actions.
Furthern1ore, the Un1teti. States hai.i to make an appear-

or

Emce

treating the Organization of .american States

and the United Nations with deference while using
clandestine modes of persuasion and diplomacy to protect her actions.
the

o.A.s.

The Soviet Union is not a member of

and is not a frontline protagonist of the

dispute, thus she could operate more eff ecti vel:r behind
the wall of an interes tea party•

'l1his

gave tha U. s. n.R.

a distinct advantage in international diploma1Jy.
The real issue 1s whether or not Secretary
tulles and the State Department would have countenanced
a full and impartial investigation oy an international
body.

An international faot-finJ group woulu have found

ample proof of a communist government, notorious secret
police and ruthless government.

Certainly· it is also

possible that the United States was .fearful of criticism
about its financial ano. pol1t:i.cal interests in Guatemala.

The enigma of Guatemala results from both the c()lll.munist
and the corporate monopolies and aristocratic favoritism
of the United States.

Obviously the United States did

not wish to have the 1 atter investigated by the world.
Thus, the United Nations had to be ignored.

It la

interesting to note' that the United States condoned
United Mations intervention in Korea and Triests -- why

45
not in Guatemala? 27

A synopsis of opinion of many foreign diplomats relevant to the role of the United States in Guate-

mala was coherently if not eloquently expressed by
Clement Atlee. titular leaCie.:r of the British labor party,
•ie cannot pass this af f as just a Central
American squabble, of which there are so
many. There was a principle involved and
that principle was the responsibility of
the United Nations • • • , I am afraid
that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant
taste in one's mouth. .aecause. to illustrate the theme I was putting it seems in
some instances that the ao ceptance of the
princlples of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of communism.28

The sarcasm expressed by the British leader
placed the United

State~

in a precarious position.

The

charge of hlcGartbyism, viewod abroad as symptomatic of
our naivete, was still discussed in diplomatic circles.
The United States government wl th ample assistance from the tabloid press exploitea the threats of
comn1unist intervention in Guatemala to the utmost.

State Department had to do something.

The

The United

Nations. led by the skill.ful Hussian propaganO.ists,
coula very easily have exposed .American intervention
claims• so Scc1•e tary Dulles had no choice but to die tute

our desires to the Caracas Assembly.

The most ells-

couraging aspect of the Guatemalan incident was not the
27 Arthur .Koch, New iork Times, June

28Taylor, op. cit.

a1, 1955.
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bow or why, but the skill and tactics used 01 our
government.

rhe Gua temalau incidents plainl7 illus-

1

trate one grim fact:

Unitecl States diplomacy is often-

times formulated in a vacuum.
At a time when world peace hangs pz•ecarL:maly

on the balance of United States diplomacy, it is ctitf1cult to be optimistic about the future.
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